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Abstract 
We examine the use of strategic rights in research and development 
(R&D) agreements between a client and an agent, when an entrant may 
compete with the client for the license of non-contracted discoveries 
developed by the agent. The agent puts effort either in the contracted 
project, or into other R&D activities which can result in non-contracted 
discoveries. Strategic rights help the client and the agent extract rent 
from the entrant, and also motivate the agent to place effort into the 
contracted project. Accordingly, firms are more likely to adopt strategic 
rights when the likelihood of entry is larger. Moreover, strategic rights 
and termination rights are substitutes in mitigating agency problems. By 
investigating R&D agreements between pharmaceutical clients and bio-
tech agents, we find consistent evidence of the positive impact of entry 
threat on the use of strategic rights, as well as evidence of the 
substitution between strategic rights and termination rights.  
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1. Introduction  
Strategic rights are contract clauses used as strategic tools against entrants. These 
rights are widely adopted in sales, acquisitions, and strategic alliances, when contracts 
are incomplete and entry threat exists. In particular, research and development (R&D) 
agreements between clients and agents are often incomplete, because these firms cannot 
anticipate or specify all of the potential discoveries. Consequently, other firms can then 
enter and compete for the licensing rights of the non-contracted discoveries developed 
by the agents. Thus, the agents may devote more effort to non-contracted R&D 
activities, instead of the activities specified in the agreements.  
In practice, R&D agreements often include strategic rights, which provide some 
advantage to clients against entrants in their competition for the licensing of non-
contracted discoveries. For example, the most favored licensee clause and the right of 
first refusal between a client and an agent typically specify that, if the agent develops a 
non-contracted discovery and receives an offer from another potential licensee, the 
agent must inform the client and the client then has the right to obtain the license by 
matching the outside offer.2  
The theoretical literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1987) shows that strategic 
contracts can help extracting rent from entrants and protect investments of the 
contracting parties. However, little formal analysis has been performed on how 
strategic contracts affect agents’ R&D incentives or how strategic rights interact with 
other contract terms, such as termination rights.3 This paper provides a theoretical 
analysis, together with empirical evidence, that aims to shed light on these issues.  
We consider a model where, after a client devotes investments and hires an agent 
to conduct an R&D project, the agent can allocate effort to either the contracted project 
or other non-contracted R&D activities. A potential entrant may compete for the license 
of non-contracted discoveries. In the benchmark case without any strategic right, the 
licensing of non-contracted discoveries follows standard first-price or second-price 
auctions. A larger likelihood of entry increases the agent’s incentive to shift effort into 
                                                          
2 A related but different clause, the right of first offer, requires the agent to first make an offer to the 
client. If the client rejects the offer, the agent can look for other buyers/licensees but cannot sell the 
license in more favorable terms than the offer extended to the initial client. Firms may also use other 
clauses, such as rights of first discussions/considerations, which require agents to negotiate with clients 
before searching for other buyers, but often do not set restrictions on sales terms. 
3 Termination rights without cause allow clients to terminate projects without pre-specified conditions. 
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non-contracted R&D activities. Consequently, the client might not make jointly 
beneficial investments. 
We illustrate the effects of strategic rights by analyzing the right of first refusal, and 
then, more generally, characterize the optimal strategic contract for the client who has 
all the bargaining power.4 Adopting strategic rights increases the client’s contracting 
costs. However, compared to standard auctions, strategic rights offer the client a larger 
winning probability in the competition over non-contracted discoveries and reduce the 
agent’s expected revenue from non-contracted discoveries. Thus, strategic rights not 
only help the contracting parties extract more rent from the entrant, but also enhance 
the agent’s incentives to exert effort in the contracted project. A larger likelihood of 
entry uplifts both effects and, consequently, increases the firms’ incentives to adopt 
strategic rights. Moreover, we show that strategic rights and termination rights are 
substitutes in mitigating agency problems. 
The theoretical analysis suggests that firms may have different incentives for using 
strategic rights, which we observe in practice. For example, among nine R&D 
agreements signed between Abbott, a pharmaceutical firm, and various agents between 
1992 and 1998, three agreements adopted the right of first refusal while the others did 
not include any strategic right.5 More generally, using a dataset of R&D agreements 
between pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents, we obtain empirical observations 
that firms are more likely to include strategic rights in R&D agreements when the 
potential entry threat for the licensing of non-contracted discoveries is larger. More 
importantly, we find a negative correlation between the use of strategic rights and the 
use of termination rights which allow clients to terminate projects without cause. These 
observations are consistent with our theoretical predictions. 
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on strategic contracts. Contracts 
can be used as strategic tools to extract rent from entrants (Aghion and Bolton, 1987). 
Strategic contracts can also preserve incentives for relationship-specific investments 
(Rogerson, 1984, 1992; Chung, 1991; Spier and Whinston, 1995; Che and Chung, 1999; 
Che and Hausch, 1999; Segal and Whinston, 2000; Che and Lewis, 2007) and facilitate 
trade (Hua, 2007; Matouschek and Ramezzana, 2007). Bikhchandani, Lippman, and 
Ryan (2005), Choi (2009), Grosskopf and Roth (2009), and Hua (2012) analyze the use 
                                                          
4 The main insights hold qualitatively if the agent also has some bargaining power. 
5 The observations are based on the Recap dataset, which we will describe in Section 4.  
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of the right of first refusal and/or the right of first offer. Other studies examine the most 
favored customer clauses (Butz, 1990; Cooper and Fries, 1991; Daughety and 
Reinganum, 2004). Different from the literature, our study illustrates the effect of 
strategic contracts in mitigating agency problems, as well as the relationship between 
strategic rights and termination rights. We also provide empirical evidence on both the 
adoption of strategic rights and the relationship between strategic rights and termination 
rights.6 
Our paper is also related to the empirical studies on contracts in several 
dimensions.7 First, our paper complements the studies on control rights and contingent 
contracts (Caves et al., 1983; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Elfenbein and 
Lerner, 2003; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Zanarone, 2009; 
Lerner and Malmendier, 2010; Susarla, 2012; Crama et al., 2016; Elfenbein and Lerner, 
forthcoming). Second, our paper attempts to answer an important but understudied 
question: what the interaction is among different contract clauses. To date, a few studies 
have shown complementarity among certain contract terms (Brickley, 1999; Lafontaine 
and Raynaud, 2002; Hueth et al., 2008).  Our analysis provides evidence of a possible 
substitution relationship between strategic rights and termination rights. Third, by 
considering entry threat and agency issues, our paper also contributes to the empirical 
literature on exclusive dealing (Marvel, 1982; Heide et al., 1998; Dutta et al., 1999; 
Zanarone, 2009) and the literature on share contracts (Brickley and Dark, 1987; 
Lafontaine, 1992, 1993; Gil and Lafontaine, 2012). Different from the literature, our 
paper focuses on the adoption of strategic rights, as well as the relationship between 
strategic rights and termination rights.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. 
Section 3 analyzes the effects of strategic rights as well as the relationship between 
strategic and termination rights. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the 
empirical observations. Section 6 concludes the paper. All the proofs and tables are 
gathered in the appendices.  
 
                                                          
6 Grosskopf and Roth (2009) conduct an interesting experimental study on the right of first refusal. 
Crocker and Lyon (1994) study the effects of the most favored nation clauses on product market 
competition.  
7 See Lafontaine and Slade (2012) for a more detailed summary of the literature. 
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2. The Model 
Consider three risk-neutral players: a client P, an R&D agent A, and an entrant E. 
E arrives with probability 𝜃 > 0 after P and A enter into an R&D contract. 8 𝜃 can be 
interpreted as the degree of entry threat. We focus on the competition between P and E 
for obtaining the licenses of R&D discoveries, instead of product market competition, 
where the firms develop and sell two different products.9 We also abstract away from 
the possibility for P and E to obtain licenses for the same discovery. 
P can make capital investment I>0 and hire A to conduct one R&D project C, 
looking for a particular discovery D.  At the same time, A has another private R&D 
project NC, which, without extra capital and effort, results in some discovery with 
probability 𝛽. However, by shifting the investment and effort to Project NC, A can 
increase the probability of finding a discovery from Project NC to 𝛼 + 𝛽, where 𝛼 <
1 − 𝛽. We assume that Project C is contractible while Project NC is non-contractible.10 
Accordingly, we call the discovery from Project C the contracted discovery and 
discoveries from Project NC the non-contracted discoveries.11 
After signing the R&D contract, A privately allocates the investment and effort, 𝑒 ∈
{𝐶, 𝑁𝐶}, into either Project C or Project NC, but not both. To simplify the analysis, 
assume that the effort cost is zero. 
If 𝑒 = 𝐶, with probability 𝛼, A finds the contracted discovery D; independently 
with probability 𝛽, he obtains a non-contracted discovery.  
If 𝑒 = 𝑁𝐶, with probability 𝛼 + 𝛽, he finds a non-contracted discovery but never 
obtains the contracted discovery.  
We assume that A lacks the necessary production and marketing resources, and 
therefore, the realization of any value from discoveries requires licensing to P or E. The 
market value of the contracted discovery is  𝑢 > 0, which is commonly known.  
In contrast, the value of a non-contracted discovery is uncertain before it is found, 
reflecting the fact that it may come from a large pool of possible discoveries. Moreover, 
                                                          
8 We do not consider potential mergers between clients and agents, which are possible in practice but 
can be costly. Also, without loss of generality, we consider only one entrant in the model.  
9 Product market competition can affect the agent’s R&D effort, but does not motivate firms to use the 
strategic rights analyzed in this paper.  
10  For example, Project NC may lead to one of many potential discoveries, and therefore, is not 
contractible.  
11 We ignore possible complementarity or substitution between different discoveries, as analyzed by Hart, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) in an agency framework without entry threat.  
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P and E may derive different values, 𝑣𝑃 and 𝑣𝐸 , from the non-contracted discovery. 𝑣𝑃 
and 𝑣𝐸  are independent and drawn from the same distribution 𝐹(𝑣), with 𝑓(𝑣) > 0 for 
any 𝑣 ∈ [𝑣, 𝑣] and a monotone hazard rate: 𝐻(𝑣) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑣)) 𝑓(𝑣)⁄  decreasing in 𝑣. 
Each firm privately observes his value after the non-contracted discovery is found.12    
Define 𝑣 = ∫ ∫ max(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑝)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸). Throughout the paper, assume that 
𝐼
?̂?
> 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≡
𝐼
𝑢
. That is, it is socially efficient for P to make the investment and for A 
to put effort into Project C, whereas it is never efficient to put effort into Project NC. 
However, a moral hazard problem exists in that A may put effort into Project NC.  
We abstract away from any asymmetric information which may exist between P 
and A in the contracting stage. This admittedly strong assumption simplifies the 
analysis. Without loss of generality, we assume that P has all the bargaining power and 
can make a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer. Thus, the optimal contract should 
maximize P’s expected utility. Thus, the optimal contract always gives P the license of 
the contracted discovery.  
The R&D contract specifies an ex-post royalty payment 𝑟 ≥ 0  from P to A, 
conditional on finding the contracted discovery.13 To be realistic, assume that A has no 
capital and P has sufficient capital to make the royalty payment.14 Therefore, the total 
expected payment from P to A cannot be negative. 
The contract can also include some clause or mechanism for the licensing of any 
non-contracted discovery. Adding such a clause would increase P’s contracting cost by 
𝛿 > 0.15 Without such a clause, when a non-contracted discovery is found and E enters, 
P and E compete in a standard first-price or second-price auction; when E does not 
arrive, P is the only buyer, and therefore, has all the bargaining power in negotiating 
with the agent.  
Finally, the contract can contain a termination right which allows P to terminate the 
contract without cause. Adding such a right would also increase P’s contracting cost by 
                                                          
12 We also examine a variant of the model where P observes 𝑣𝑃  before contracting. Our main results 
regarding the effects of strategic contracts remain robust (see Appendix C).  
13 In practice, royalty payments can depend on sales volume. We abstract away from this possibility by 
assuming that the market value of the contracted discovery is fixed at 𝑢. Therefore, without loss of 
generality, royalty can be simplified as an ex-post flat payment in the model.  
14 As shown by Hua (2007), P’s financial constraint can affect the design of strategic contracts. Including 
a financial constraint would complicate the analysis without generating extra insights in this paper.  
15 Contracting costs include extra time or effort when negotiating and implementing the mechanism. Our 
results remain valid regardless of whether P or A bears such costs.  
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𝛿 > 0. After A puts in effort, with probability 𝜙 ≤ 1, P observes a non-verifiable signal 
𝑠 ∈ {1, 0} about the progress of Project C. If 𝑠 = 1, Project C will be successful with 
the contracted discovery developed; if 𝑠 = 0, Project C will fail.16 Note that A’s effort 
choice will affect the probability of observing the signal. If A has chosen 𝑒 = 𝐶, then P 
observes 𝑠 = 1 with probability 𝛼𝜙, observes 𝑠 = 0 with probability (1 − 𝛼)𝜙, and 
does not get any signal with probability 1 − 𝜙 . If A has chosen 𝑒 = 𝑁𝐶 , then P 
observes 𝑠 = 0 with probability 𝜙 and does not get any signal with probability 1 − 𝜙.  
The assumption that 𝑠  is non-verifiable reflects the reality that, in many R&D 
projects, the progress is hard to be verified by the courts or outsiders. Thus, we focus 
on the termination right without cause, which gives the client more flexibility than the 
termination right with conditions.17 It would be meaningful to relax this assumption 
and examine the differences among various termination rights in future research.  
Upon observing the signal, P decides whether or not to exercise the termination 
right. If so, he obtains a residual value 𝑤, which reflects the potential savings of the 
investment costs. 18  If the contract is terminated, the contracted discovery is not 
developed, whereas A finds a non-contracted discovery with probability 𝛽, regardless 
of whether he has put effort into Project C or NC. Assume that 𝛼𝑣 < 𝑤 < 𝛼𝑢 and 
(1 − 𝛼)𝑤 > 𝛿 . Thus, if P always observes the signal, the expected savings of 
investment costs, (1 − 𝛼)𝑤,  is larger than the contracting cost to include the 
termination right.  
The above-mentioned termination right works in a way similar to staged financing, 
which, as illustrated in the literature, can motivate agents to exert effort.19 In many 
R&D agreements, it is difficult to specify verifiable “stages” of progress. In practice, 
staged financing often requires clients to continue financing upon observing positive 
and verifiable signals about the progress of the contracted projects, while termination 
rights without cause allow clients to discontinue the projects upon observing negative 
and possibly non-verifiable signals about the progress of the projects or associated 
agency problems.  
                                                          
16 The main results in this paper still hold if s is a noisy signal about the progress of Project C.  
17 A more general model can consider a signal which is verifiable, but only with some probability. If this 
is the case, both termination rights without cause and with conditions can be included.  
18 In practice, R&D agreements may also specify, upon termination, how to allocate the ownership of 
current or potential discoveries between clients and agents. We abstract away from such complications. 
As long as the termination reduces the probability of finding discoveries, the main results hold.  
19 For examples, see Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1998), and Neher (1999). 
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As shown in Figure 1, the timing is as follows: 
Date 1: P makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to A. If A rejects the offer, the 
game moves to Date 4. If A accepts, P makes the investment 𝐼. 
Date 2: A chooses the investment target as well as effort 𝑒 ∈ {𝐶, 𝑁𝐶}, which is 
unobservable to any other player. 
Date 3: P observes a non-verifiable signal 𝑠 ∈ {1, 0} with probability 𝜙 ≤ 1 and 
decides whether to exercise the termination right if it is specified in the contract. 
Date 4: R&D outcomes are realized. Whenever A finds a non-contracted discovery, 
E enters with probability 𝜃. In addition, P and E (if he arrives) privately observe their 
values on that discovery.  
Date 5: If the R&D contract between P and A includes a mechanism regarding the 
licensing of non-contracted discoveries, the allocation of the license is determined by 
that mechanism; otherwise, the allocation is determined by the standard first-price or 
second-price auction.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
3. Theoretical Analysis of Strategic Rights 
Various strategic rights share the same feature of giving initial clients a competitive 
advantage against entrants. Instead of having a lengthy analysis of all strategic rights, 
we will first illustrate the effects of strategic rights by examining the right of first refusal. 
Then we will follow the approach in Hua (2007) to characterize the optimal strategic 
contract for client P. At the end, we will examine the relationship between strategic 
rights and termination rights without cause. 
As a benchmark, suppose that the R&D contract between P and A does not include 
a termination right or any mechanism regarding the licensing of non-contracted 
discoveries. If A develops a non-contracted discovery, two scenarios emerge: 
First, when E arrives, P and E compete in the standard first-price or second-price 
auction. Accordingly, if 𝑣𝐸 ≤ 𝑣𝑃, P wins the license with the expected payment of 𝑣𝐸  
to A; otherwise, E wins with the expected payment of 𝑣𝑃 to A.  
Second, when E does not enter, P obtains the license with zero payment.  
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Under both scenarios, the joint benefit for P and A from the non-contracted 
discovery equals 𝑣𝑃 . A’s expected revenue from the non-contracted discovery is 
𝜃𝑅0,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑅0 ≡ ∫ [∫ 𝑣𝐸𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣𝑃
𝑣
+ ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣𝑃
]𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
. 
Suppose that P and A have signed a R&D contract. At Date 2, A would put effort 
into Project C if and only if:  
𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅0 ≥ (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0 
or equivalently, 𝑟 ≥ 𝜃𝑅0. 
Given that P has all the bargaining power, he would offer a royalty payment 𝑟0 =
𝜃𝑅0. Thus, at Date 1, A’s expected utility from both the contracted and non-contracted 
discoveries is (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0 . P’s expected utility from making the investment is 
𝛼(𝑢 − 𝜃𝑅0) − 𝐼, which is positive if and only if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 ≡
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃𝑅0
. Note that 𝛼0 > 𝛼 ≡
𝐼
𝑢
.  Lemma 1 summarizes these observations.  
 
Lemma 1: Suppose that the licensing of non-contracted discoveries is determined by 
the standard first-price or second-price auction. There exists a cut-off 𝛼0 , which 
increases in 𝜃, such that if 𝛼 > 𝛼0,  P makes the investment and offers A a royalty 
payment 𝑟0 = 𝜃𝑅0; if 𝛼 < 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0, P does not make the investment. 
 
Intuitively, to solve the agency problem that A may shift the investment and effort 
into Project NC, P must offer a sufficiently large royalty payment, which can be too 
costly for P, and therefore, discourage P from making the investment, especially when 
the probability of finding the contracted discovery is not high.  
 
3.1 Illustration with the Right of First Refusal  
The right of first refusal (ROFR) requires that when A develops a non-contracted 
discovery and E enters, E first makes a bid and then P has the right to win the license 
by matching E’s bid. Choi (2009) shows that ROFR helps contracting parties extract 
more rent from entrants, but does not examine agents’ incentives to contribute effort.  
Suppose that P and A have signed one R&D contract including ROFR. If A develops 
a non-contracted discovery, two scenarios emerge:  First, if E does not enter, P obtains 
the license with zero payment; second, if E arrives, he makes a bid 𝑏 to buy the license 
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and then P matches E’s bid if and only if 𝑣𝑃 > 𝑏. Anticipating this, E chooses the bid 
to maximize his expected utility: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑏(𝑣𝐸 − 𝑏)𝐹(𝑏) 
Thus, E’s optimal bid 𝑏𝐸 = 𝑏𝐸(𝑣𝐸) satisfies:  
𝑏𝐸 +
𝐹(𝑏𝐸)
𝑓(𝑏𝐸)
= 𝑣𝐸 . 
Accordingly, given the non-contracted discovery, A’s expected revenue is 
𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 ≡ 𝜃 ∫ 𝑏𝐸(𝑣𝐸)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
. The joint benefit for P and A is 
∫ ∫ max {𝑣𝑃, 𝑏𝐸(𝑣𝐸)}𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
, larger than ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
, their joint benefit 
under the standard auctions. It is easy to verify that P’s winning probability is higher 
than under the standard auctions. Intuitively, by giving P a larger winning probability, 
ROFR forces E to make a higher payment (whenever it wins) and therefore increases 
the joint benefit for P and A from non-contracted discoveries by  𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅, where: 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅= ∫ ∫ max {𝑣𝑃, 𝑏𝐸(𝑣𝐸)}𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
− ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
> 0. 
Furthermore, as shown in the mechanism design literature (Myerson, 1981), the 
standard auctions can maximize the seller’s (here, the agent’s) expected revenue. 
However, since ROFR distorts the competition between P and E, it reduces A’s 
expected revenue from the non-contracted discovery, that is, 𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 < 𝜃𝑅0.
20 At Date 
2, A would put effort into Project C if and only if: 
𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 ≥ (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅, 
or, equivalently, 𝑟 ≥ 𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 .  At Date 1, A would accept the contract with ROFR if 
and only if his utility is larger than that without any R&D contract: 
                                                𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 ≥ 𝛽𝜃𝑅0.                                        (1) 
Without loss of generality, in this sub-section, assume that (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 < 𝛽𝜃𝑅0.
21 
Then, as long as condition (1) holds, A would put effort into Project C. Thus, given 
ROFR, P would offer a royalty payment of 𝑟𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 =
𝛽𝜃
𝛼
(𝑅0 − 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅). Accordingly, 
A’s expected utility equals 𝛽𝜃𝑅0, smaller than his utility in the benchmark case with 
                                                          
20 The formal proof is similar to the analysis in the mechanism design literature and is therefore omitted.  
21 This assumption holds, for example, if 𝛽 is sufficiently large. Without this assumption, the agent’s 
expected utility would be higher than 𝛽𝜃𝑅0, but still less than (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0. Thus, the main result in 
Proposition 1 holds qualitatively. 
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standard auctions, (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0.  Intuitively, compared to the standard auctions, ROFR 
reduces A’s expected revenue from the non-contracted discoveries and enhances his 
incentive to put effort into Project C.  
To summarize, ROFR not only helps the contracting parties extract more rent of 
𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 from the entrant, but also reduces the agency cost by 𝛼𝜃𝑅0. Both the rent 
extraction effect and the reduction of the agency cost uplift P’s incentive to make the 
investment, which brings a net value of 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼. Note that both the rent extraction effect 
and the saving of the agency cost increase in 𝜃. It then follows that P adopts ROFR 
when 𝜃 is sufficiently large.  
 
Proposition 1: Given the other parameter values, a cut-off  𝜃 > 0 exists such that, if 
and only if the probability for E to enter is larger than 𝜃, P will adopt ROFR in the 
R&D contract.  
 
The analysis suggests that ROFR can help the contracting parties extract rent from 
the entrant and mitigate the agency problem. However, ROFR may not be the optimal 
strategic contract for P.  
 
3.2 The Optimal Strategic Contract without Termination Rights 
Now we derive the optimal strategic contract that maximizes P’s expected utility, 
without considering the termination right. In particular, we extend the analysis in Hua 
(2007) and focus on the direct revelation mechanism: when A develops a non-
contracted discovery and E enters, P and E are asked to report their values. Given their 
reports, 𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸 , P and E obtain the license with probability 𝑞𝑃(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)  and 𝑞𝐸(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸), 
respectively, with ex-post payments 𝑡𝑃(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)   and 𝑡𝐸(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)  to A.
 22  As in the 
literature on mechanism design, we use the following notations: for 𝑖 = 𝑃, 𝐸,
 𝑄𝑖(𝑣𝑖) ≡ ∫ 𝑞𝑖(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑗)
𝑣
𝑣
 is 𝑖’s expected winning probability, given his reported 
value;  𝑇𝑖(𝑣𝑖) is 𝑖’s expected payment to A for the non-contracted discovery. 
                                                          
22 For simplicity, we do not consider reserve prices in the mechanism design. The reserve price does not 
affect our results qualitatively. We also do not observe the use of reserve prices in our contract dataset. 
12 
 
 
Define A’s ex-post revenue from the non-contracted discovery as  𝜃𝑅1 ≡
𝜃[∫ 𝑇𝑃(𝑣𝑃) 𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) +
𝑣
𝑣
∫ 𝑇𝐸(𝑣𝐸)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
] . Then, P would offer a contract (𝑟, 𝑄𝑖 ,
𝑇𝑖), 𝑖 = 𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸, to maximize his expected utility:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑟,𝑄𝑖,𝑇𝑖)𝛼(𝑢 − 𝑟) − 𝐼 − 𝛿
+ 𝛽 {(1 − 𝜃) ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
+ 𝜃 ∫ [𝑄𝑃(𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃 − 𝑇𝑃(𝑣𝑃)]𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
} 
subject to: 𝑄𝑖(𝑣)𝑣 − 𝑇𝑖(𝑣) ≥ 𝑄𝑖(?̃?)𝑣 − 𝑇𝑖(?̃?) for all 𝑖, 𝑣, ?̃?                                    (IC) 
            𝑄𝑖(𝑣)𝑣 − 𝑇𝑖(𝑣) ≥ 0 for all 𝑖, 𝑣                                                               (IR) 
            𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅1 ≥ 𝛽𝜃𝑅0                                                                   (Ex-ante IR) 
            𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅1 ≥ (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1                                                   (Agent’s Effort) 
 
Recall that 𝛽𝜃𝑅0 is A’s revenue from non-contracted discoveries in the benchmark 
case with standard auctions. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) guarantees 
truth telling from P and E. The individual rationality constraint (IR) assumes that A 
cannot force P or E to pay a transfer higher than his value from the non-contracted 
discovery. Moreover, the ex-ante individual rationality constraint (Ex-ante IR) makes 
this contract acceptable to A and the agent’s effort constraint assures that A puts effort 
into Project C.  
Denote the solution to the problem as (𝑟∗, 𝑄𝑖
∗, 𝑇𝑖
∗), 𝑖 = 𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸 . Note that, to 
motivate A to put effort into Project C, the royalty payment should satisfy 𝑟∗ ≥ 𝜃𝑅1, 
which, together with the ex-ante IR constraint, implies (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1 ≥ 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. Under the 
optimal mechanism, this ex-ante IR constraint is binding; otherwise, P can increase his 
utility by reducing 𝑇𝑃(𝑣) (and 𝑅1) for all 𝑣 by a small amount. Therefore, we have 
𝑅1 < 𝑅0 .  That is, compared to the standard auctions, the optimal mechanism reduces 
A’s expected revenue from non-contracted discoveries.  
As shown in Appendix B, whenever a non-contracted discovery is found and E 
enters, under the optimal mechanism, if 𝑣𝑃  is greater than 𝑣𝐸 −
1−𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑓(𝑣𝐸)
, P wins the 
license of the non-contracted discovery; otherwise, E wins. Compared to the standard 
auctions, this mechanism offers P a larger winning probability. Additionally, E’s 
expected ex-post payment to A is 𝑇𝐸
∗(𝑣𝐸) = 𝑄𝐸
∗ (𝑣𝐸)𝑣𝐸 − ∫ 𝑄𝐸
∗ (𝑥)𝑑𝑥.  
𝑣𝐸
𝑣
 P’s expected 
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ex-post payment to A is 𝑇𝑃
∗(𝑣𝑃) = 𝑄𝑃
∗ (𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃 − ∫ 𝑄𝑃
∗ (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑧,
𝑣𝑃
𝑣
 where 𝑧 ≥ 0  is 
chosen such that (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1 = 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. 
Similar to ROFR, the optimal mechanism brings two effects. First, given that P has 
a larger winning probability, E can win the license only when he is willing to make a 
large payment. Define  
∆= ∫ 𝑄𝑃
∗ (𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + ∫ 𝑇𝐸
∗(𝑣𝐸)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
− ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃).
𝑣
𝑣
 
Note that, compared to the standard auctions, the optimal mechanism changes the 
(expected) joint benefit for P and A from the non-contracted discovery by 𝛽𝜃∆. As 
shown in Appendix B, 𝛽𝜃∆> 0.  
Second, the optimal mechanism can also mitigate the agency problem. As shown 
earlier, compared to the standard auctions, the optimal mechanism reduces A’s expected 
revenue from non-contracted discoveries. Consequently, A has greater incentives to put 
effort into Project C. Note that A’s expected utility equals 𝛽𝜃𝑅0, which is smaller than 
his utility in the benchmark case with the standard auctions, (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0.   
To summarize, the optimal mechanism helps to extract more rent 𝛽𝜃∆ from the 
entrant and also reduces the agency cost by 𝛼𝜃𝑅0. Both effects enhance P’s incentive 
to make the investment, which brings a net value of 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼. Following this observation, 
we characterize P’s optimal contract in Lemma 2.  
 
Lemma 2: P makes the investment if and only if 𝛼 > 𝛼0  or 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 +
𝛽𝜃∆ − 𝛿 > 0. When making the investment, if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 ≤ 0,  P 
offers a royalty payment 𝑟0 = 𝜃𝑅0  without any strategic mechanism; otherwise, P 
offers the contract with a royalty payment 𝑟∗ = 𝜃𝑅1 and the following optimal strategic 
mechanism: whenever a non-contracted discovery is found and E enters, if 𝑣𝑃 is greater 
than 𝑣𝐸 −
1−𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑓(𝑣𝐸)
, P wins the license; otherwise, E wins. 
 
Note that both the rent extraction effect and the reduction of the agency cost 
increase in 𝜃. Proposition 2 then follows. 
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Proposition 2: Given the other parameter values, a cut-off  ?̃? > 0 exists such that, if 
and only if the probability for E to enter is larger than ?̃?, P adopts the optimal strategic 
mechanism for the licensing of non-contracted discoveries.  
 
The analysis suggests that strategic rights help contracting parties extract more rent 
from entrants, and also mitigate agency problems and encourage clients to make 
investments. Accordingly, firms are more likely to adopt strategic rights when potential 
entry threat is larger. We will empirically investigate this prediction in Section 5.  
 
3.3 Strategic Rights and Termination Rights 
In this sub-section, consider the possibility of including a termination right in the 
R&D contract. Given the assumption 𝑣 < 𝑤 < 𝛼𝑢 , when holding the termination right, 
P would terminate the contract and obtain the residual value 𝑤 at Date 3 when 
observing 𝑠 = 0, but not terminate when he observes 𝑠 = 1 or does not get any signal.23  
Suppose that P and A have signed an R&D contract that includes a termination right 
but not any mechanism for the licensing of non-contracted discoveries. Given any non-
contracted discovery, A’s expected revenue is 𝜃𝑅0. Note that if A puts effort into Project 
NC, P terminates the contract with probability 𝜙 and, therefore, the probability of A 
finding a non-contracted discovery is 𝛼(1 − 𝜙) + 𝛽. Thus, at Date 2, A would put 
effort into Project C if and only if:  
𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃𝑅0 ≥ (𝛼(1 − 𝜙) + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0, 
or equivalently,  𝑟 ≥ (1 − 𝜙)𝜃𝑅0. By contrast, recall that in the benchmark case, A 
would put effort into Project C if and only if 𝑟 ≥ 𝜃𝑅0.  Given the termination right, P 
would offer a royalty payment 𝑟𝑇 = (1 − 𝜙)𝜃𝑅0 , while A always accepts such a 
contract. Accordingly, A’s expected utility equals (𝛼(1 − 𝜙) + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0 , which is 
smaller than his utility in the benchmark case with the standard auctions, (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0. 
That is, the termination right reduces the agency cost.   
Note that both the strategic right and termination right can mitigate the agency 
problem. Therefore, these two clauses can be substitutes. However, the overall 
comparison of the two contract clauses is ambiguous. For simplicity, we focus on 
                                                          
23 For simplicity, we ignore renegotiation after A puts in effort. Potentially, P could threaten to terminate 
the agreement and renegotiate with A, even when observing 𝑠 = 1. However, as long as the residual 
value w is sufficiently smaller than 𝑢, such a threat is not credible.  
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parameter values under which, without a termination right, P would adopt the optimal 
strategic mechanism.   
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that 𝛼 > 𝛼0  and 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 > 0 or 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 −
𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆ − 𝛿 > 0. There exist cut-offs  0 < 𝜙𝐿 ≤ 𝜙𝐻 < 1 and ?̂? > 0: When 𝜙 ≤ 𝜙𝐿, 
P offers a royalty payment 𝑟∗ = 𝜃𝑅1 together with the optimal strategic mechanism, 
but not the termination right; when  𝜙 ≥ 𝜙𝐻 and 𝛽 < ?̂?, P offers a royalty payment 
𝑟𝑇 = (1 − 𝜙)𝜃𝑅0, together with the termination right, but not the optimal strategic 
mechanism.  
 
The results can be understood intuitively. When the probability of observing the 
interim signal is small, the termination right is not overly effective. Consequently, P 
would adopt the strategic mechanism to extract more rent from E and mitigate the 
agency problem. In contrast, when the probability of observing the interim signal is 
large enough, the termination right becomes highly effective in saving the investment 
costs and solving the agency problem. Thus, P has less incentive to use the strategic 
mechanism. Furthermore, if the probability of having non-contracted discoveries (𝛽) is 
small and therefore strategic rights do not help extracting much rent from E, P would 
not adopt the strategic mechanism.  
To summarize, the analysis implies that strategic rights and termination rights can 
be substitutes in mitigating agency problems. This will be empirically investigated in 
Section 5.  
 
4. Data 
We use the Thomson Reuters Recap Dataset (Recap), which contains a full list of 
all R&D alliance deals between pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents during 1974-
2009. For most of the deals, the dataset only includes basic information (e.g., 
contracting parties, disease type, and stage of the R&D project involved). Within the 
above list, Recap provides contract details for 1,703 R&D agreements, which we use 
for the investigations. 24  We first clean this dataset by eliminating non-R&D 
                                                          
24 According to the disclosure by Recap, for the agreements with details, at least one of the contracting 
parties was publicly listed in the contracting year. This data limitation can cause potential bias, since the 
size of the sampled client firms may be larger than the industry average. In an earlier version of this 
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agreements,25 agreements involving more than three bio-tech agents,26 and agreements 
with universities or non-profit organizations as agents. We also drop contracts signed 
before 1990, approximately 2.38% of the total sample.27 The selection process results 
in 915 observations. We then read through all the agreements to identify the various 
strategic and termination rights.  
For strategic rights, we refer to “most favored licensee/company,” “right of first 
refusal,” “right of first offer,” “right of first discussion/consideration,” and other similar 
rights which give clients an advantage when they compete with potential entrants over 
licenses for non-contracted discoveries. Appendix A provides a brief description of 
these rights. We create a dummy variable for the strategic rights: “strategic right” 
equals 1 if an agreement includes any strategic right and 0 otherwise. As summarized 
in Table 1, approximately 24% of the agreements include strategic rights.28 
In the Recap dataset, all agreements grant clients termination rights, some with 
verifiable conditions and others without cause. Termination rights without cause 
provide stronger incentives for agents to devote effort than other termination rights. 
Thus, we focus on termination rights without cause: “termination” equals 1 if an 
agreement offers a termination right without cause to the client and 0 otherwise.29 
About 41.86% of the agreements include termination rights without cause.   
 
Measures of Entry Threat 
                                                          
paper, we show that the main results stay robust after we control for client size (measured by total asset) 
and ROA (measured by net earnings divided by total asset), though it would significantly reduce the 
number of observations. Additionally, the activities of the sampled client firms might be more visible 
than that of the other firms, which, however, would not drive our empirical results.  
25 Recap classifies the nature of each agreement. If an agreement is classified as “R,” “D,” “CoD,” and/or 
“CoL,” it involves R&D activities by the agent. We also read all the contracts to verify their nature.  
26 Agreements with three or more agents have too much heterogeneity among the agents, and therefore, 
are eliminated. We keep a few agreements with two agents and take the average of the agents’ 
characteristics. 
27 The main results stay robust when the data observations before 1990 are included.  
28 Various types of strategic rights may impose different degrees of binding power concerning the sales 
of non-contracted discoveries. In Section 5.2, we construct another measure of strategic rights based on 
their binding power. The empirical results are robust. 
29 It is difficult to subjectively evaluate the strength of various conditions associated with termination 
rights. Some conditional termination rights specify “cure periods”, which allow agents to fix violations 
to the conditions before the termination rights are exercised. Intuitively, termination rights with cure 
periods are less stringent than those without cure periods. The main results stay robust when we 
incorporate two dummy variables on termination rights: “termination_2” equals 1 if an agreement 
contains the termination right without cause and 0 if otherwise; “termination_1 equals 1 if an agreement 
only contains a conditional termination right without any cure period and 0 if otherwise.   
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We are interested in how the level of potential entry threat affects firms’ incentives 
to adopt strategic rights. One typical approach in the literature is to construct entry 
threat measures based on observations of historical entry. Unfortunately, such entry 
information is not available, as our paper focuses on entry threats from potential buyers 
of licenses for non-contracted R&D discoveries, but not on product market competition 
between clients and firms that have conducted relevant research and developed 
alternative drugs. Additionally, given our focus on the pharmaceutical industry, 
traditional entry measurements at the industry level do not work; rather, we must 
address potential entry threats at the disease level, given that R&D agreements normally 
target certain disease types.30  
We use historical clinical trials by other pharmaceutical firms to proxy the potential 
entry threat at the disease level. Intuitively, firms with more experience in clinical trials 
for a certain disease type have an advantage in competing for licenses of discoveries of 
the same type. These firms also have more expertise in determining the potential value 
of discoveries of the same type. New firms or firms that try to change their business 
scopes can become entrants, but they are less competitive. Thus, if there have been 
more trials for a certain disease type, the entry threat for non-contracted discoveries of 
that type is larger. 
Recap provides data on clinical trials, with disease types, that have been filed by 
pharmaceutical firms with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since 1963. 
Based on this information, we construct the measures for entry threat. The Recap 
dataset classifies 21 disease types.31 Because the disease classification might affect the 
market boundaries and potential entry threat, we check whether this classification is 
consistent with those employed by the World Health Organization (25 types 
                                                          
30 In practice, some drugs have had their use changed to different disease types. However, non-contracted 
discoveries are more likely to be of the same disease type, given agents’ expertise and the focus of 
scientific tests on certain disease types (see a related review by Ban (2006)). Klein (2008) also argues 
that cost-control measures have reduced the probability of finding discoveries with different disease 
types. The shift of a drug’s use from one disease to another often occurs at the very late clinical trial 
stages or even in the product markets. In this paper, we focus on the R&D stages of drug developments 
and, therefore, conduct the analysis based on the disease type in the agreements.  
31 The disease types include allergic, autoimmune inflammatory, bone, cancer, cardiovascular, central 
nervous system, dental oral, dermatologic, endocrinological and metabolic, gastrointestinal, 
genitourinary gynecologic, hematologic, infectious-bacterial, infectious-miscellaneous, infectious-viral, 
ophthalmic, psychiatric, renal, respiratory, transplantation, and other miscellaneous. 
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classified)32 and FDA (22 types classified).33 More than 85% of the diseases classified 
by the three sources can be matched, suggesting the classification by Recap is standard. 
Information about clinical trials in the very early years may not be complete. 
Moreover, for a particular client involved in a certain R&D project, clinical trials 
conducted by other pharmaceutical firms in more recent years can imply a larger entry 
threat than those in earlier years. To deal with such a data limitation and potential time 
trend, we take the following steps. First, we drop the contracts signed before 1990. 
Second, we construct the following entry threat measures by counting trials conducted 
by third parties within different-length time periods (10 years and 5 years) before clients 
and agents entered into the current agreements:34 
For a particular agreement, “entry threat (trials)” (and “entry threat 5 (trials)) is the 
log value of 1 plus the number of other firms’ clinical trials for the same disease type 
in the 10 years (and 5 years, respectively) before contracting. 
 For a particular agreement, “entry threat (trial firms)” (and “entry threat 5 (trial 
firms)) is the log value of 1 plus the number of other pharmaceutical firms that have 
conducted clinical trials for the same disease type in the 10 years (and 5 years, 
respectively) before contracting. 
Since our empirical results stay robust under the above measures, in Section 5, we 
shall use “Entry Threat (trials)” as the main variable on entry threat. 
 
Other Variables 
We control several firm-specific and project-specific factors in the estimations. 
First, we consider equity links between clients and agents. As Filson and Morales (2006) 
show, many R&D agreements include equity links such that clients buy agents’ equity 
stakes. The Recap dataset provides information on equity investments by clients in 
agents’ firms as part of the upfront or continuing payments in R&D agreements. In 
theory, equity links can mitigate potential agency problems and therefore may interact 
with strategic rights. To address this possibility, we construct and control “equity link,” 
which equals 1 if there are equity payments from the client and 0 otherwise.  
                                                          
32 Source: http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en 
33 Source: https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/search/browse?brwse=cond_cat 
34 Our empirical results stay robust with entry threat measures based on the trials in all previous years.   
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Previous cooperation can help clients obtain more information about agents’ 
abilities and build up trust between them, thereby affecting contract design. Based on 
the full list of R&D deals provided by Recap, we construct “previous relationship” as 
the log value of 1 plus the number of projects jointly conducted by a client and an agent 
in the 10 years before they entered into the current agreement.35  
The uncertainty level of R&D projects is often associated with the stages of drug 
development, which, in order of timing, include discovery, lead molecule, 
preclinical/formulation, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III trials, BLA/NDA filed, and 
approved. The first two stages typically face more uncertainty. Following Lerner and 
Malmendier (2010), we construct a variable “early stage” as a measure of uncertainty, 
which equals 1 if an agreement involves R&D activities in the discovery and/or lead 
molecule stages and 0 otherwise.36 We also control “project size (in million USD)” 
provided in the Recap dataset. 
We construct a variable “Cancer_Cardio,” which equals 1 if the agreement involves 
cancer or cardiovascular and 0 otherwise. Cancer and cardiovascular disease are the 
leading causes of death in the US, while the other diseases lead to significantly fewer 
death cases.37 To capture potential disease fixed effects, it seems ideal to include 20 
disease dummies into the estimations, which, however, would lead the p-value of the 
overall F-test for the whole regression to be larger than 10%, making the regression 
lose validity. One possible reason for this is that we build our entry threat measures at 
the disease level. That is, the entry threat is potentially a function of the disease type. 
Thus, the disease fixed effects may have been captured by the entry threat measures to 
some extent, and it can cause multicollinearity if we further add all disease dummies.  
Since most of the agents are small and privately held, we do not have their financial 
information. Instead, we try to control agents’ R&D experience and define “agent R&D 
experience” as the log value of 1 plus the number of R&D projects that the agent has 
conducted in the 10 years before the current agreement, based on the full list of R&D 
                                                          
35 We have tried alternative constructions for “previous relationship” by referring to the number of joint 
projects by a client and an agent within the last five years and in all previous years. The results are robust.  
36 We have also tried estimations by including a dummy variable for every stage. Our main results stay 
robust under these alternative measures of uncertainty.  
37 Source: National Vital Statistics Report (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf). 
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deals provided by Recap. 38  Additionally, we control “agent listed,” which equals 1 if 
the agent is publicly listed during the contracting year and 0 otherwise.  
Government regulations for the pharmaceutical industry have changed over time. 
In the 1990s, implementation of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act led to more registration requirements for 
clinical trials.39 Also, in the early 2000s, more regulations and laws were implemented 
to emphasize the disclosure of trials.40 To capture the possible effects from regulation 
changes and the corresponding time trends, we control a “timing” dummy, which equals 
1 if an agreement is signed during 2000-2009 and 0 otherwise. Including year fixed 
effects would be one of the most straightforward ways to control for the effects from 
business cycles, industry trends, and other industry-specific events. However, when 
year dummies are included, the p-value of the overall F-test for the whole regression 
becomes larger than 10%.  Thus, one limitation of this study is that we cannot rule out 
the potential effects from business cycles or industry trends.   
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all the variables. In this table, we report 
the absolute values. In the regression estimations, we convert the values of the variables 
“entry threat (trials)”, “agent R&D experience” and “previous relationship” into log 
values. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
5. Empirical Observations 
In this section, we first present the main empirical observations regarding the 
adoption of strategic rights in R&D agreements, as well as the relationship between 
strategic rights and termination rights. Then we discuss the robustness of the results by 
using alternative measures of entry threat.  
 
5.1 Entry Threat, Strategic Rights, and Termination Rights 
The first two columns of Table 2 report the marginal effects in logit estimations 
with “entry threat (trials)” as the main entry threat measure and “strategic right” as 
                                                          
38 We try alternative constructions for “agent R&D experience” by referring to the number of R&D 
projects that the agent has conducted in the last five years and in all previous years. The results are robust.  
39 Source: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ115/pdf/PLAW-105publ115.pdf#page=16 
40 Sources: https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-site/history#CongressPassesLawFDAMA 
    and http://www.ortsedu.com/Guidance/FDA-Guidance-07.pdf 
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the dependent variable. 41 We control the project characteristics, including “project size,” 
“early stage,” “equity link,” “Cancer_Cardio,” the timing dummy, and agent 
characteristics. 42 The specification in Column 2 also controls “termination.” However, 
in doing so, we do not suggest any causality between termination rights and strategic 
rights but only try to address their correlation. To capture the possibility that the 
uncertainty level of R&D projects may affect the relationship between strategic rights 
and terminations rights, we also include one interaction term, “termination*early stage.”  
No reverse causality problem exists in our estimations regarding the effects of entry 
threat on the use of strategic rights for two reasons. First, the entry threat measures are 
based on data from the years before a certain agreement is signed. Second, many R&D 
agreements are confidential and cannot be observed by other firms before entry. 
The likelihood of having non-contracted discoveries varies among R&D projects. 
Also, the level of non-contractibility may affect both the adoption of strategic rights 
and the entry threat. However, this endogeneity problem is not relevant to our analysis. 
Our entry threat measures are based on other firms’ trials in previous years, which 
should not be affected by the level of non-contractibility in the current projects. 
Additionally, market size at the disease level can affect our entry threat measures, but 
does not directly change firms’ incentives to adopt strategic rights.43  
 (Insert Table 2 here) 
The main results in Table 2 are consistent with the theoretical predictions from 
Section 3. In particular, the marginal effect of “entry threat (trial)” is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that a larger entry threat increases firms’ incentives to 
adopt strategic rights regarding the future licensing of non-contracted discoveries. The 
result is similar under the alternative measures of entry threats, “entry threat 5 (trials),” 
“entry threat (trial firms),” and “entry threat 5 (trial firms).” As shown in Section 3, 
strategic contracts help contracting parties extract more rent from entrants and provide 
agents greater incentives to devote effort to contracted R&D activities, with both effects 
increasing in the level of the potential entry threat.  
                                                          
41 We also verify the significance of the regression coefficients (available upon request).  
42 The main results stay robust after we control client size and profitability measured by ROA, though it 
would significantly reduce the number of observations. Since we do not observe any significant effect 
from client size and ROA, the main estimations do not control these two variables.  
43 All the strategic rights considered in this paper involve competition between clients and entrants over 
the licenses of non-contracted discoveries. Without any entry threat, theoretically, firms have no other 
motivation to use these strategic rights even when the potential market size is large. 
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Furthermore, the marginal effect of “termination” is negative and statistically 
significant. This result implies that strategic rights and termination rights tend to be 
substitutes in contract design, consistent with our theoretical analysis. Intuitively, both 
strategic rights and termination rights can motivate agents to put effort into contracted 
R&D activities instead of non-contracted activities, and therefore, they can be 
substitutes. 44 Studies on the interaction among contract terms have been limited. The 
literature mainly shows complementarity among certain contract terms. Our analysis 
complements the literature by providing evidence of a possible substitution relationship 
between the various contract rights. 
Additionally, in Table 2, the marginal effect of “termination*early stage” is 
significantly negative, implying that, for R&D projects associated with the earlier 
stages of drug development, the substitution between termination rights and strategic 
rights becomes stronger. Intuitively, since the early stages of drug development face 
more uncertainty, clients are more likely to terminate projects upon observing negative 
signals about the projects’ progress. Consequently, termination rights are more 
effective in motivating agents to place effort into contracted R&D activities. Thus, the 
potential benefits of using strategic rights to address agency problems becomes smaller.  
 
5.2. Robustness Analysis 
In this sub-section, we verify the robustness of the main empirical observations 
under some alternative measures of strategic rights and entry threat.  
First, the various strategic rights may have different degrees of binding power 
concerning the licensing of non-contracted discoveries. For example, the most favored 
licensee, right of first refusal, and right of first offer clauses share a similar feature in 
that clients have priority in winning non-contracted discoveries in terms not less 
favorable than those offered to/by entrants, while the other strategic rights do not set 
such restrictions on selling terms. To capture this variation, we create an alternative 
measure, “strategic right (ordered),” which equals 2 if an agreement includes “most-
favored licensee/company,” “right of first refusal,” or “right of first offer,” 1 if it 
includes any other strategic right, and 0 if no strategic right is included. The empirical 
                                                          
44 The substitution relationship can also be explained by the asymmetric information theory if agents 
with better abilities for contracted R&D activities have smaller chances of finding non-contracted 
discoveries. Agents with better abilities are more willing to accept termination rights, while smaller 
chances of finding non-contracted discoveries reduce firms’ incentives to use strategic rights.   
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observations regarding the adoption of strategic rights as well as the relationship 
between strategic rights and termination rights stay robust with this alternative measure.  
Second, we consider the alternative measures of entry threat based on other 
pharmaceutical firms’ R&D or marketing projects by using the full list of R&D alliance 
deals provided by Recap:45 for a particular agreement, “entry threat (projects)” (and 
“entry threat 5 (projects)) is the log value of 1 plus the number of other pharmaceutical 
firms’ R&D or marketing projects for the same disease type in the 10 years (and 5 years, 
respectively) before contracting. 
Intuitively, when the market size for one disease type is larger, more entrants will 
compete for the licensing rights of that type. If the above variables are significantly and 
positively correlated with the market size of the same disease type, they can serve as 
indirect entry threat measures.46 We do not have sufficient data on market size at the 
disease level for the long term. Instead, we obtain the sales data of the top 200 branded 
and top 200 generic drugs between 2000 and 2010, as published by the Newsmagazine 
for Pharmacists. For each year, we calculate the total sales of those top-branded drugs 
for the same disease type as an imperfect proxy for market size. We find a positive and 
significant correlation between the total sales at the disease level and the number of 
projects of the same type conducted by other firms in the last 5 and 10 years. 47 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 report the marginal effects of the estimations using 
“entry threat (projects)” as the measure on entry threat, with the main results staying 
robust.  
To summarize, this section has identified two observations consistent with our 
theoretical analysis: contracting parties use strategic rights more often when the 
potential entry threat is larger; also, strategic rights and termination rights tend to be 
substitutes in R&D agreements.  
 
6. Conclusion  
                                                          
45 In theory, agents may try to include contract terms preventing clients from signing agreements with 
other agents for the same disease type, which would affect the construction of entry threat measures. 
However, we do not observe such contract terms in our dataset. Additionally, clients often sign 
agreements during different periods of time, and different projects for the same disease type may not 
compete directly with each other. 
46 The pharmaceutical firms that have conducted R&D or marketing projects for one disease type are 
more likely to enter and compete for discoveries of the same type (Allain, Henry, and Kyle, 2015). 
47 We obtain similar results when using the total sales of top generic drugs at the disease level and the 
total sales of both branded and generic drugs at the disease level as proxies for market size.  
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This paper examines firms’ incentives for using strategic rights in R&D agreements. 
It provides important implications for contract design when contracts are incomplete 
and potential entry threat exists. Strategic rights not only allow the contracting parties 
to extract more rent from potential entrants, but they also motivate agents to put effort 
into contracted R&D activities by reducing agents’ expected revenue from non-
contracted R&D discoveries. Consequently, firms are more likely to use strategic rights 
when the likelihood of entry is larger. We further show that strategic rights and 
termination rights can be substitutes in mitigating agency problems.  
Using a dataset of R&D agreements between pharmaceutical clients and bio-tech 
agents, we find empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical analysis. In particular, 
strategic rights are more likely to be adopted when potential entry threats are larger. 
We also find evidence of substitution between strategic rights and termination rights. 
This substitution relationship is stronger in projects involved in earlier R&D stages.  
Our results are derived under some data limitations and strong assumptions. We 
construct the indirect entry threat measures at the disease level, given that we do not 
have sufficient information on historical entry. Also, to focus on the design of strategic 
contracts, in both the theoretical and empirical analysis, we ignore the possibility of 
mergers between clients and agents.48 We also ignore equity links between clients and 
agents in the theoretical analysis, while equity links can potentially substitute strategic 
rights in mitigating agency problems. Future studies combining mergers, equity link, 
and contract design are desirable. Lastly, how different contract clauses interact with 
each other and the effects of contracting arrangements on innovation efficiency are also 
important but under-investigated areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48  Mergers can prevent other firms from competing for the licenses of non-contracted discoveries. 
Possible reasons for firms adopting strategic contracts, instead of mergers, may include the high 
uncertainty level of R&D projects and the integration costs of mergers.  
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Appendix A: Descriptions of Various Strategic Rights 
The following provides brief descriptions of various strategic rights adopted in the 
R&D agreements contained in the Recap dataset.  
Most favored licensee/company: If the agent develops a non-contracted discovery, 
the client has priority in winning the discovery at the same licensing terms when 
competing with other potential licensees.  
Right of first refusal: If the agent develops a non-contracted discovery and receives 
an offer from another potential licensee (i.e., the entrant), the agent must inform the 
client, who has the right to obtain the license by matching the outside offer. If the client 
matches the outside offer, there would be no further negotiation. If the client does not 
match the outside offer, the agent can accept the offer from the entrant. 
Right of first offer: When a non-contracted discovery is found, the agent should first 
make an offer to the client (or the client should first make an offer to the agent), before 
searching for other potential licensees. If the client (or the agent) rejects the offer, the 
agent can look for other licensees, but cannot sell the license in more favorable terms 
than the offer extended to (or offered by) the initial client. 
Right of first discussion/consideration: When a non-contracted discovery is found, 
the agent should first make an offer to the client (or the client should first make an offer 
to the agent), before searching for other potential licensees. If the client (or the agent) 
rejects the offer, the agent can look for other licensees. However, different from the 
right of first offer, these clauses do not impose restrictions on the licensing terms with 
other licenses. 
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Appendix B: Proofs of the Theoretical Results 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First, if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 , as shown in Lemma 1, in the benchmark case with standard 
auctions, P would make the investment while A obtains expected utility of (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0. 
In contrast, as shown in the text, with ROFR, A obtains expected utility of 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. That 
is, ROFR saves P’s agency cost by 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 . Furthermore, ROFR increases the joint 
benefit for P and A from Project NC by 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅. Therefore, P offers a contract with 
ROFR if and only if the potential gain is larger than the extra contracting cost, i.e. 
𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 > 𝛿. 
Second, if 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0, in the benchmark case with standard auctions, P would not make 
the investment and A obtains expected utility of 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. As shown in the text, ROFR 
does not change A’s utility, but increases the joint benefit for P and A from Project NC 
by 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 . In addition, the net benefit from making the investment is 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼. 
Therefore, P offers a contract with ROFR if 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅> 𝛿.                
To summarize, P makes the investment if and only 𝛼 > 𝛼0, or 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 −
𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 > 0. When making the investment, if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 +
𝛼𝜃𝑅0 ≤ 0,  P offers a royalty payment 𝑟0  without ROFR; otherwise, P offers the 
contract with ROFR and a royalty payment 𝑟𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅. 
Define 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3 such that 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 − 𝛼𝜃1𝑅0 = 0 , 𝛽𝜃2∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃2𝑅0 − 𝛿 = 0 , 
𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃3∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 = 0 . It is easy to verify that, 𝛼(𝜃1−𝜃2)𝑅0 = 𝛽(𝜃2 −
𝜃3)∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅. Three scenarios are possible.  
First, if 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃3 , define 𝜃 = min {1, 𝜃2} . For any 𝜃 > 𝜃 , we have 𝛼 =
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃1𝑅0
< 𝛼0 ≡
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃𝑅0
 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 > 0; for any 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃 , we have 𝛼 ≥
𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 ≤ 0. Therefore, if and only if 𝜃 > 𝜃 , P would adopt 
ROFR.  
Second, if 𝜃1 > 𝜃2 > 𝜃3 , define 𝜃 = min {1, 𝜃2}. For any 𝜃 ≥ 𝜃1, we have 𝛼 =
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃1𝑅0
≤ 𝛼0 ≡
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃𝑅0
 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 > 0; for any 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃, 𝜃1), we have 
𝛼 > 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 > 0 ; for any 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃 , we have 𝛼 >
𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 ≤ 0. Therefore, if and only if 𝜃 > 𝜃 , P would adopt 
ROFR.  
Third, if 𝜃1 < 𝜃2 < 𝜃3, define 𝜃 = min {1, 𝜃3}. For any 𝜃 > 𝜃, we have 𝛼 < 𝛼0 
and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 > 0; for any 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃1, 𝜃], we have 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 +
𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 − 𝛿 ≤ 0 ; for 𝜃 < 𝜃1 , we have 𝛼 > 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑅 + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 < 0. 
Therefore, if and only if 𝜃 > 𝜃, P would adopt ROFR.                                        Q.E.D.      
                                                                       
Proof of Lemma 2:  
The proof is similar to the analysis in Hua (2007) and therefore we only provide a 
sketch here. As shown in the text, to motivate A to put effort in Project C, the royalty 
payment should satisfy 𝑟∗ ≥ 𝜃𝑅1. Without loss of generality, suppose that P chooses 
𝑟∗ = 𝜃𝑅1. The ex-ante IR constraint must be binding; otherwise P can always increase 
his utility by reducing 𝑇𝑃(𝑣) (and 𝑅1) for all 𝑣 by a small amount. Therefore, we have  
(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1 = 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. 
Applying the standard mechanism design approach to the IC and IR constraints, we 
can show that, under the optimal mechanism, for 𝑖 = 𝑃, 𝐸, 𝑄𝑖
∗(𝑣) is non-decreasing in 
𝑣  and 𝑇𝑖
∗(𝑣) = 𝑄𝑖
∗(𝑣)𝑣 − ∫ 𝑄𝑖
∗(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑣
𝑣
− 𝑉𝑖(𝑣),  where 𝑉𝑖(𝑣) is 𝑖′𝑠  expected ex-post 
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utility when his value is 𝑣.  The optimal mechanism should set 𝑉𝐸(𝑣) = 0. In contrast, 
to ensure that the ex-ante IR constraint is binding, we need to choose 𝑉𝑃(𝑣) ≥ 0 such 
that (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1 = 𝛽𝜃𝑅0.  
Given the binding ex-ante IR constraint, the objective function can be re-written as                
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑟,𝑄𝑖,𝑇𝑖)𝛽 {(1 − 𝜃) ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)
𝑣
𝑣
+ 𝜃[∫ 𝑄𝑃(𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + ∫ [𝑄𝐸(𝑣𝐸)𝑣𝐸 − ∫ 𝑄𝐸(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑣
𝑣
]𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
]}
+ 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 − 𝛿 
Integrating the above objective function by parts, and then substituting 𝑄𝑃(𝑣𝑃) ≡
𝐸𝑣𝐸[𝑞𝑃(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)], 𝑄𝐸(𝑣𝐸) ≡ 𝐸𝑣𝑃[𝑞𝐸(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)], the optimization problem becomes: 
   𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑞𝑖)𝛽(1 − 𝜃) ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 − 𝛿
𝑣
𝑣
 
+𝛽𝜃 ∫ ∫ {[𝑣𝑃]𝑞𝑃(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸) + [𝑣𝐸 −
1 − 𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑓(𝑣𝐸)
] 𝑞𝐸(𝑣𝑃 , 𝑣𝐸)}
𝑣
𝑣
𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
 
         Subject to: 𝑄𝑖(𝑣𝑖) is non-decreasing in 𝑣𝑖, for 𝑖 = 𝑃, 𝐸. 
                             
Maximizing the above problem point-wise, we have the optimal strategic 
mechanism: if 𝑣𝑃  is greater than 𝑣𝐸 − (1 − 𝐹(𝑣𝐸)) 𝑓(𝑣𝐸)⁄ , P wins the license; 
otherwise, E wins. Accordingly, 𝑄𝑖
∗(𝑣𝑖) is non-decreasing in 𝑣𝑖 , for 𝑖 = 𝑃, 𝐸, given 
(1 − 𝐹(𝑣)) 𝑓(𝑣)⁄  decreasing in 𝑣. Also, it is easy to verify that 𝑧 = 𝑉𝑃(𝑣) ≥ 0 exists 
such that (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅1 = 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. Given this mechanism, if a non-contracted discovery is 
found and E enters, the joint benefit for P and A from the non-contracted discovery is  
 ∫ 𝑄𝑃
∗ (𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + ∫ 𝑇𝐸
∗(𝑣𝐸)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)}
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
 
= ∫ ∫ {[𝑣𝑃]𝑞𝑃(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸) + [𝑣𝐸 −
1−𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑓(𝑣𝐸)
] 𝑞𝐸(𝑣𝑃, 𝑣𝐸)}
𝑣
𝑣
𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)
𝑣
𝑣
, 
which is higher than their joint benefit under the standard auctions, ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃).
𝑣
𝑣
 
Therefore, we have  
∆= ∫ 𝑄𝑃
∗ (𝑣𝑃)𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + ∫ 𝑇𝐸
∗(𝑣𝐸)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝐸)}
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
𝑣
− ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) > 0.
𝑣
𝑣
 
Now consider two scenarios. First, if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 , as shown in Lemma 1, in the 
benchmark case with standard auctions, P would make the investment while A obtains 
an expected utility of (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0. In contrast, under the above strategic mechanism, A 
obtains an expected utility of 𝛽𝜃𝑅0. That is, the strategic mechanism saves P’s agency 
cost by 𝛼𝜃𝑅0. Furthermore, this mechanism increases the joint benefit for P and A from 
Project NC by 𝛽𝜃∆. Therefore, P offers a contract with the optimal strategic mechanism 
if and only if 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 > 𝛿. 
Second, if 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0, in the benchmark case with standard auctions, P would not make 
the investment and A obtains expected utility of 𝛽𝜃𝑅0 . The optimal strategic 
mechanism does not change A’s utility, but increases the joint benefit for P and A from 
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Project NC by 𝛽𝜃∆. In addition, the net benefit from making the investment is 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼. 
Therefore, P makes the investment and adopts the optimal strategic mechanism if and 
only if 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆> 𝛿.                                                                                                         Q.E.D.                                                                                                                 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and we only provide a sketch here. 
Define 𝜃1′, 𝜃2′, 𝜃3′ such that 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 − 𝛼𝜃1′𝑅0 = 0 , 𝛽𝜃2′∆ + 𝛼𝜃2′𝑅0 − 𝛿 = 0 , 𝛼𝑢 −
𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃3′∆ − 𝛿 = 0 . Note that, 𝛼(𝜃1′−𝜃2′)𝑅0 = 𝛽(𝜃2′ − 𝜃3′)∆. Three scenarios are 
possible.  
First, if 𝜃1′ = 𝜃2′ = 𝜃3′ , define ?̃? = min {1, 𝜃2′} . For any 𝜃 > ?̃? , we have 𝛼 =
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃1𝑅0
< 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆ − 𝛿 > 0; for any 𝜃 ≤ ?̃?, we have 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆ +
𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 ≤ 0. Lemma 2 then implies that, if and only if 𝜃 > ?̃?, P would adopt the 
optimal strategic mechanism.  
Second, if 𝜃1′ > 𝜃2′ > 𝜃3′  , define ?̃? = min {1, 𝜃2′} . Similar to the analysis in 
Proposition 1, Lemma 2 implies that, if and only if 𝜃 > ?̃?, P would adopt the optimal 
strategic mechanism.  
Third, if 𝜃1′ < 𝜃2′ < 𝜃3′ , define ?̃? = min {1, 𝜃3′} . Similar to the analysis in 
Proposition 1, Lemma 2 implies that, if and only if 𝜃 > ?̃?, P would adopt the optimal 
strategic mechanism.                                                                                              Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
Suppose that 𝛼 > 𝛼0 and 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛼𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿 > 0, or 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0 and 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + 𝛽𝜃∆ −
𝛿 > 0 . Under the contract with a royalty payment 𝑟𝑇 = (1 − 𝜙)𝜃𝑅0  and the 
termination right, the joint benefit for P and A from Project C is 𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼 + (1 −
𝛼)𝜙𝑤 − 𝛿. Since the termination right does not change P’s benefit from non-contracted 
discoveries, he would make the investment as long as his expected utility from the 
contracted discovery, 𝛼(𝑢 − 𝑟𝑇) − 𝐼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜙𝑤 − 𝛿, is positive.  
If P only adopts the optimal strategic mechanism as specified in Lemma 2 but not 
the termination right, his utility is 
𝐴1 = (𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼) + 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛽 ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) − 𝛽𝜃𝑅0
𝑣
𝑣
− 𝛿.                                                                          
If P only adopts the termination right, given 𝑟𝑇, his utility is 
      𝐴2 = (𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼) +  𝛽 ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) +
𝑣
𝑣
(1 − 𝛼)𝜙𝑤 − (𝛼(1 − 𝜙) + 𝛽)𝜃𝑅0 − 𝛿.                                                            
If P adopts both the strategic mechanism and the termination right, his utility can 
be written as 
      𝐴3 = (𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼) + 𝛽𝜃∆ + 𝛽 ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑃) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜙𝑤 − 𝛽𝜃𝑅0
𝑣
𝑣
− 2𝛿.                                               
 When 𝜙 = 0,  obviously, P and A would not adopt the termination right. According 
to Lemma 2, P and A would adopt the optimal strategic mechanism. By continuity, 
there exists  𝜙𝐿 > 0  such that when 𝜙 ≤ 𝜙𝐿, P and A adopt the strategic mechanism 
but not the termination right. 
When 𝜙 = 1, given the assumption (1 − 𝛼)𝑤 − 𝛿 > 0, 𝐴3 is strictly larger than 
𝐴1. Define ?̂? such that ?̂?𝜃∆ − 𝛿 = 0. For 𝜙 = 1 and  𝛽 < ?̂? , 𝐴2 is strictly larger than 
𝐴3. By continuity, there exists a cut-off  𝜙𝐻 < 1  such that, as long as  𝜙 ≥ 𝜙𝐻 and 
𝛽 < ?̂? , P and A adopt the termination right but not the strategic mechanism.                                                                                                         
Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C: Robustness with the Ex-ante Observable Value 
Our main model in Section 2 assumes that P observes his value 𝑣𝑃  of a non-
contracted discovery only after the discovery is developed. The main insights, however, 
are robust under the alternative framework where P observes 𝑣𝑃 before contracting. For 
illustration, suppose that 𝑣𝑃 ∈ [0,1] is observed by both P and A at Date 1. At Date 4, 
upon entry, E privately observes his value, 𝑣𝐸 , which is drawn from the uniform 
distribution on [0,1]. We further assume that 𝑢 > 1 and 𝜙=0.  
As a benchmark, suppose that the licensing of non-contracted discoveries follows 
the standard auction. Similar to the analysis in Section 3, we can show that the expected 
joint benefit for P and A from non-contracted discoveries is 𝛽𝑣𝑃, while A’s revenue 
from non-contracted discoveries is 𝛽𝜃[∫ 𝑣𝐸𝑑𝑣𝐸
𝑣𝑃
0
+ ∫ 𝑣𝑃𝑑𝑣𝐸
1
𝑣𝑃
] = 𝛽𝜃(𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
).  
In this benchmark case, given the royalty payment 𝑟, A would put effort into Project 
C if and only if 
𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝜃(𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
) ≥ (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜃(𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
), 
or, equivalently, 𝑟 ≥ 𝜃(𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
). Thus, P would offer a royalty payment 𝑟0 = 𝜃(𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
). P’s expected utility from Project C is 𝛼(𝑢 − 𝑟0) − 𝐼, which is positive if and only 
if 𝛼 > 𝛼0 ≡
𝐼
𝑢−𝜃(𝑣𝑃−
𝑣𝑃
2
2
)
.  To summarize, P would make the investment and offer a 
royalty payment of 𝑟0 if and only if 𝛼 > 𝛼0.  
Now suppose that the R&D contract can include a strategic right for the licensing 
of non-contracted discoveries. It is easy to show that the optimal contract for P would 
specify the following mechanism: For any non-contracted discovery, A should first 
offer a price of 
1+𝑣𝑃
2
 to E; if E accepts, A would transfer 
1+𝑣𝑃
2
 to P as a break-up fee, and 
if E declines, P would obtain the license with zero payment.  
With the above mechanism, A does not receive any revenue from non-contracted 
discoveries and would put effort into Project C given any positive royalty. 
Furthermore, A would accept the contract with the above mechanism as long as 
𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽 ∗ 0 ≥ 𝛽𝜃 (𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
). 
Thus, the lowest royalty payment is 𝑟 =
𝛽
𝛼
𝜃 (𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
). It can be verified that, given 
this royalty payment and the above strategic mechanism, P’s expected utility is  
(𝛼𝑢 − 𝐼) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜃)𝑣𝑝 + 𝜃
(1+𝑣𝑃)
2
4
] − 𝛽𝜃 (𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
) − 𝛿. 
Similar to the analysis in Section 3, the above mechanism have two effects. First, 
this mechanism helps extracting more rent from E: The joint benefit for P and A from 
non-contracted discoveries is 𝛽[(1 − 𝜃)𝑣𝑝 + 𝜃
(1+𝑣𝑃)
2
4
] , larger than that in the 
benchmark case (𝛽𝑣𝑃). Second, it mitigates the agency problem and reduces P’s agency 
cost by 𝛼𝜃 (𝑣𝑃 −
𝑣𝑃
2
2
). Both effects would encourage P to make the investment. In 
particular, when 𝛼 < 𝛼0, in the benchmark case with the standard auctions P would not 
make the investment, whereas  the strategic mechanism restores P’s investment 
incentives. 
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Appendix D: Summary Statistics and Empirical Results 
Table 1 Summary Statistics  
Discrete Variables 
 
Obs 0 1 2 
  
 
Strategic Right  915 695 220 
   
  Termination 915 532 383 
   
 
Agent Listed 915 284 631 
   
 
Cancer_Cardio 915 601 314 
   
 
Early Stage  898 444 454 
   
 
Equity Link 915 538 377 
   
 
Timing 915 664 251 
   
Continuous Variables  
 
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Skewness 
 Entry Threat (trials) 915 98.92 139.71 0 701 1.97 
 Entry Threat (projects) 915 332.15 435.84 0 3001 2.39 
 
Previous Relationship 915 0.18 0.62 0 6 4.45 
 
Agent R&D Experience 915 7.2 8.6 0 59 1.95 
 
Project Size (in million USD) 843 100 160.54 0 953 2.63 
Note: We report the level for each variable in this table, while we use log values for “entry threat (trials)”, 
“entry threat (projects)”, “R&D experience” and “previous relationship”   in the regression models. 
“Timing” equals 1 if an agreement is signed during 2000-2009 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 Entry Threat, Strategic Right and Termination Right (Marginal Effects 
Reported) 
 
Strategic 
Right  
Strategic 
Right  
Strategic 
Right  
Strategic 
Right  
Entry Threat (trials) 0.020 0.027 
  
 
(1.65)* (2.25)** 
  
Entry Threat (projects) 
  
0.033 0.038 
   
(2.97)*** (3.55)*** 
Project Size 173.976 167.265 143.517 134.922 
 
(1.52) (1.49) (1.25) (1.20) 
Cancer_Cardio -0.044 -0.061 -0.06 -0.073  
(1.15) (1.64) (1.75) (2.20)** 
Agent Listed -0.046 -0.035 -0.05 -0.041 
 
(1.30) (1.04) (1.43) (1.19) 
Early Stage -0.047 -0.019 -0.039 -0.011 
 
(1.49) (0.51) (1.25) (0.29) 
Previous Relationship 0.021 0.011 0.022 0.011 
 
(0.41) (0.22) (0.42) (0.22) 
Agent R&D Experience -0.021 -0.024 -0.021 -0.024 
 
(1.34) (1.6) (1.31) (1.56) 
Equity Link 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.023 
 
(0.59) (0.71) (0.61) (0.76) 
Termination 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.109 
  
(2.78)*** 
 
(2.86)*** 
Termination*Early 
Stage 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.122 
 
(2.43)** 
 
(2.51)** 
Timing  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
N 826 826 826 826 
Pseudo R-sq 0.016 0.05 0.023 0.059 
Chi^2 14.41 46.11 21.04 54.47 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics; ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% 
significance.  
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